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The latest economic literature highlights the importance of labour market institutions in the 
economy’s capacity to adjust to different macroeconomic shocks.1 Among the numerous 
institutional arrangements that make up the labour market, wage determination mecha-
nisms tend to play a prominent role when it comes to explaining how much of the adjust-
ment ends up being pushed onto employment. In this respect, collective bargaining sys-
tems conducive to the adaptation of wages to cyclical fluctuations and shocks of various 
kinds smooth the changes in the level of employment. By contrast, systems with greater 
wage rigidity tend to generate more pronounced fluctuations in employment over the busi-
ness cycle.
The high employment variability is one of the singular features of the cyclical behaviour of 
the Spanish economy. In the latest crisis, for example, the magnitude of the destruction of 
net employment in Spain was much larger than in other euro area countries in which the 
decline in GDP or the correction in the residential construction sector were comparable. 
However, this relatively larger response by employment in Spain, along with greater wage 
inertia, is not a phenomenon particular to this crisis episode, but rather reflects a historical 
pattern.2 Behind this behaviour lie certain institutional characteristics of the Spanish la-
bour market, such as the excessive difference in the degree of protection afforded to 
permanent and temporary contracts and the inability of the collective bargaining system 
to facilitate the adaptation of wages to the economic situation and to the circumstances 
of each firm.
From this perspective, this article addresses a specifi c aspect of the wage determination 
mechanism: the capacity of wages to respond to macroeconomic shocks and its determi-
nants. With this aim, the following section provides evidence on the degree of response of 
wages to cyclical developments and infl ation, as well as an estimation of the degree of wage 
rigidity in Spain, both in real and nominal terms, comparing it with the estimates available for 
other countries. T he third section examines the relationship between the degree of wage fl ex-
ibility and certain institutional characteristics of labour markets on the basis of the information 
available for four European countries (Spain, Belgium, Denmark and Portugal). Finally, Section 
4 summarises the main conclusions.
Wage dynamics in Spain are characterised3 by the fact that the impact of the cyclical position 
of the labour market on wage settlements is very small. As seen in Chart 1 (lower panel), 
there is barely any link between wage increases and the rate of unemployment. Further, Table 
1 presents the results of a regression of collectively negotiated wage settlements on the rate 
of infl ation, changes in regional unemployment and changes in industry productivity. Little 
connection is seen between wage settlements and the labour market situation, approximat-
ed by the rate of unemployment. In fact, only newly signed agreements show some sensitiv-
ity to the labour market situation, while no such negative relationship is seen between the rate 
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1. See, for example, Álvarez et al. (2006). 2. See, for example, the evidence presented in Estrada et al. (2009). 3. See 
Bentolila et al. (2010) for a recent analysis of the cyclical insensitivity of wages in Spain and the high degree of indexation.
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of unemployment and wages in the case of revised agreements.4, 5 Also, the relationship 
between wage settlements and industry productivity is very low.
At the same time, the degree of indexation in collective bargaining is seen to be very high. As 
the upper panel of Chart 1 shows, there is a very close relationship between wage settlements 
and past infl ation, which in terms of compensation per employee is strengthened by the im-
pact of indexation clauses. In fact, the percentage of workers covered by indexation clauses 
averaged 69% over the period 2001-08. On data that are still preliminary, this proportion fell to 
64% in 2009 and then to 46% in 2010. Also, since these clauses are not symmetric, in periods 
of declining infl ation real wage increases often occur. The results of Table 1 support this evi-
4. It should be noted that only one third of agreements with economic effects are negotiated in the same year, since most 
agreements are for more than one year, and therefore can be expected to be less sensitive to contemporaneous cyclical 
factors. 5. Controlling for the nature of the agreement (newly signed or revised previously signed multi-year agree-
ments), the level at which it is negotiated (fi rm or higher level) and the sector of the fi rms it affects.
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dence, since they show that positive deviations in infl ation are passed through to wage in-
creases with a coeffi cient of nearly 1, while this pass-through does not take place when infl a-
tion falls below the 2% reference rate.
The wage inertia described above has been especially apparent during the recent eco-
nomic crisis. In 2007 and 2008 negotiated wage rates grew, driven by, among other fac-
tors, adjustments to reflect the previous years’ inflation deviations, causing wages to rise 
while demand was falling. Subsequently, the adjustment of wages in 2009 almost exclu-
sively reflected the sharp fall in inflation, despite the deterioration in the labour market. 
Only in 2010, with a two year lag from the start of the crisis, did more genuine wage mod-
eration occur, under the agreement signed by the social agents for the period 2010-12, in 
a propitious lower inflation environment. However, the activation at the beginning of 2011 
of the indexation clause led to an average wage increase of 2% in the 2010 collective 
agreements.
The results of the Survey of Wage Formation in Firms conducted in 2008 on a sample of 
Spanish fi rms by the Banco de España in collaboration with the Wage Dynamics Network 
lead to the same conclusion. The survey questions included one asking fi rms for information 
on how they achieve cost reductions when faced with a negative shock. The results show 
that, in general, the different shocks lead fi rms to reduce temporary employment, especially 
in the case of a fall in demand, with more than half of the respondents declaring that this was 
the main way of reducing costs (see Table 2). In contrast, adjustment of the wage compo-
nent, both its most stable factor and the variable one, is relatively infrequent. In the case of 
shocks affecting intermediate costs or wages, fi rms also tend to signifi cantly reduce other 
types of non-labour costs. The survey update conducted during the crisis confi rms these 
results (see Table 3).
Overall, in comparison with other European countries these results show that temporary em-
ployment is used more frequently in Spain as the main way of adjusting to shocks, while 
wages (including their fi xed and variable components) are more isolated from fi rms’ adjust-
ment needs (see Table 3). This difference is undoubtedly related to the greater importance of 
temporary employment, the greater protection of permanent employment and the high degree 
of wage rigidity in the Spanish economy.
Dependent variable: wage settlements
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Coe??cient t-statistic Coe??cient t-statistic
Positive in?ation deviation in t-1 0.94 108.6 1.13 148.9
Negative in?ation deviation in t-1 -0.19 -3.0 -0.35 -4.6
Change in unemployment rate in t-1 0.01 1.4 -0.24 -34.3
Change in sector productivity in t-1 0.004 1.6 0.003 1.1
Constant 2.66 30.8 2.38 29.6
Observations
Adjusted determination coe??cient 0.29
52,570
0.33
REVISED AGREEMENTS NEWLY SIGNED AGREEMENTS
37,256
IMPACT OF INFLATION AND CYCLICAL CONDITIONS ON WAGE SETTLEMENTS (a)  TABLE 1 
SOURCE: Bentolila et al. (2010). 
 
a. The regressions include dummy variables for sector of activity (two digits of the 1993 Spanish National Classi?cation of Economic Activities), 
level of bargaining and presence of indexation clause 
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The high inertia and infl exibility of the Spanish wage bargaining model may be illustrated more 
formally by estimating the degree of downward wage rigidity following the methodology used 
by the so-called International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP).6 This methodology, which is ex-
plained in detail in Dickens and Goette (2006), estimates this variable on the basis of a com-
parison between the observed distribution of changes in individual wages and a theoretical/
notional distribution which seeks to replicate the existence of complete fl exibility in the wage 
determination process. To construct this notional distribution it is assumed that in the situation 
of complete fl exibility the wage changes from one year to the next are distributed symmetri-
cally.7 Subsequently, the distribution of observed wage changes is estimated. In comparison 
with the notional distribution, the presence of rigidities would mean that, in response to a 
negative shock to productivity or a reduction in the fi rm’s demand, the wage changes of a 
larger number of workers would be concentrated around zero (which is known as “nominal 
rigidity”) or around the expected value for infl ation (which is called “real rigidity”).
This article presents estimates for Spain based on information supplied by the Muestra Continua 
de Vidas Laborales (Continuous Survey of Working Life, MCVL).8 This survey is restricted to work-
ers of the General Social Security Regime who work full time and have been in the same fi rm for 
at least two years, in order to calculate wage changes free from the impact of changes in employ-
ment. This fact affects the interpretation of the results obtained, insofar as it means that what is 
being estimated is the degree of rigidity of the wages of workers who remain in their jobs.9
To illustrate the estimation method used, Chart 2 shows the distribution of wage changes 
observed in a particular year (2008) and compares it with the notional distribution. As can be 
6. The IWFP is a study by more than forty researchers of the effects of infl ation on wage determination and on the nature, 
size, causes and consequences of wage rigidity. It uses individual data on wages for more than 16 countries. 7. Follow-
ing a Weibull distribution with two tails centred on the median wage change. This distribution is used because wage 
changes tend to be more concentrated around the median and, at the same time, to have extreme values with a higher 
probability than would be observed in a normal distribution. Dickens et al. (2007) present evidence to show that this 
distribution refl ects the wage changes observed in different countries particularly well. 8. Specifi cally, the 2008 wave is 
used, which contains information on a sample of 4% of all workers who had some type of relationship with the Social 
Security system that year and their previous labour history, and the period of analysis of the degree of wage rigidity is 
extended to the period 1996-2008. The MCVL also provides information on some personal characteristics (sex, age and 
contribution group; the latter may be considered a proxy for the level of education) and the work they perform (sector of 
activity, fi rm size, type of contract and wage). In particular, it provides the monthly and annual social security contribution 
base of each worker, which includes practically all wage items and, therefore, may be considered a good measure of the 
total wage paid by fi rms, at least for all those workers with wages below the maximum contribution base. As a result, all 
those workers with the maximum contribution base have been eliminated from the sample, since wage changes esti-
mated on the basis of such data are determined entirely by the annual changes in the contribution bases. Around 10-
15% of all workers have the maximum base in each year of the sample. 9. Accordingly, fi rms are not considered to be 
able to use other means of adjusting their labour costs, such as employment or hours worked per employee.
TYPE OF SHOCK
Percentage of ?rms Decline in demand Increase in cost of 
i
Increase in wage costs
Reduction in basic wage 4.8 7.2 8.9
Reduction in variable wage component 5.8 5.6 11.8
Reduction in permanent employment 11.7 4.5 7.6
Reduction in temporary employment 57.5 26.0 27.6
Reduction in hours worked per employee 5.6 4.3 4.6
Reduction in non-wage costs 14.6 52.3 39.7
CHANNELS FOR COST ADJUSTMENT IN RESPONSE TO DIFFERENT SHOCKS TABLE 2 
SOURCE: Survey of Wage Formation in Firms, conducted by the Banco de España 
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seen, the distribution of wage changes that actually occurred in 2008 is not symmetric and, in 
comparison with the notional distribution, wage cuts are less frequent, while wage increases 
above the median of the distribution are more frequent. Apart from this asymmetry, there are 
two peaks to be seen in the distribution: the fi rst one (at around zero) refl ects the frequency of 
wage freezes, while the second, higher one (at around 3%), illustrates the greater frequency of 
wage increases at around the forecast rate of infl ation10 or, in other words, of cases in which 
the constancy of wages is ensured in real terms.
The results of the estimation for the period 1996-2008 are shown in the upper panel of Chart 3. 
The estimate of the degree of real wage rigidity in Spain is seen to be much higher than that of 
nominal rigidity. Throughout the period, a relatively stable proportion of workers (between 30% 
and 40%) who in a theoretical framework of complete fl exibility would have received wage in-
creases below infl ation, maintained the level of their wages in real terms. On average during 
the period 1996-2008 this proportion was 33.7% of the total sample of workers. Meanwhile, 
it is estimated that around 16% of workers who in the notional scenario would have received 
a wage cut actually experienced no change in their wage. In this case, the proportion seems 
to follow a declining trend over the period, since it reached 21% between 1996 and 2000 and 
13% on average between 2000 and 2008.
In terms of international comparisons, and applying this methodology, Spain is among those 
countries that have a high degree of real wage rigidity, but simultaneously among those for 
which nominal rigidity is less important. However, the latter result may, in principle, contrast 
with the fi ndings of the Survey of Wage Formation in Firms mentioned above.11 In the case of 
10. This concentration of wage changes around the forecast infl ation rate is also observed for other periods. 11. In the 
case of the survey, the fi rms were asked whether they had reduced or frozen wages during the last fi ve years. Although 
the results may be affected by the business cycle, since this period was characterised by strong economic growth in 
Spain, the responses show a high degree of both nominal and real wage rigidity: 97.5% declared that they had not re-
duced or frozen nominal wages, and the proportion that declared that they had frozen wages was very small (2.4%).
Percentage of ?rms
REDUCTION IN:
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Basic wage 0.0 0.4 0.3 3.4 0.0 3.9 0.5 15.7 4.8 1.1
Variable wage component 10.9 15.8 10.3 16.7 18.6 24.3 17.3 23.9 5.8 5.9
Permanent employment 11.0 11.2 29.3 35.7 19.0 42.7 17.2 24.4 11.7 25.8
Temporary employment 6.5 10.1 29.0 45.6 27.0 34.2 15.7 3.3 57.5 42.4
Hours worked per employee 20.4 34.2 5.1 32.5 3.5 10.8 4.9 9.1 5.6 5.7
Other non-wage costs 51.2 28.2 26.0 40.6 41.5 52.8 44.5 23.6 14.6 19.2
ESTONIA SPAINBELGIUM
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
AUSTRIA
CHANNELS FOR COST ADJUSTMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES TABLE 3 
SOURCES: Wage Dynamics Network. 
 
a. Original survey. 
b. Survey update during the crisis. 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Basic wage 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.3 0.3 1.2 3.5 2.2
Variable wage component 7.5 9.9 9.3 8.8 3.0 4.6 8.0 17.0
Permanent employment 10.9 17.1 16.0 17.1 3.2 8.4 31.4 15.3
Temporary employment 28.4 33.9 28.9 20.8 37.7 40.1 8.7 10.0
Hours worked per employee 10.0 12.4 9.8 18.2 2.1 5.8 5.2 6.4
Other non-wage costs 43.2 26.2 35.0 33.8 5.2 6.4 43.3 47.0
POLANDFRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS
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real wage rigidity, Chart 3 compares the estimates available for other countries within the 
IWFP framework [Dickens et al. (2009)] and it can be seen that those for Spain are in the up-
per middle range, close to countries such as Belgium, France, Sweden and Finland, which 
have a higher degree of rigidity in real terms. In general, these countries are characterised by 
a high degree of wage indexation, given, for example, the fact that indexation clauses apply 
to the majority of workers in Belgium and the indexation of the minimum wage in France. In 
the case of Spain, as indicated above, this result is not surprising, given the fundamental role 
of infl ation, both past and projected, and the low degree of cyclical sensitivity in the wage 
formation process.12
Estimates have been made for specifi c groups of workers in order to analyse whether differ-
ences can be observed that would allow the lack of fl exibility to be associated with other 
characteristics of the wage formation process. Table 4 presents these estimates for different 
skill levels,13 age groups, contract types, fi rm sizes and sectors of activity.
In terms of the characteristics of the workers, wage rigidity is seen to be greater for the 
higher skilled workers of the fi rm. The results are similar when rigidity is computed in nominal 
terms, but one sees less variation between the different groups of workers.14 By age groups, 
one sees a negative relationship between age and the degree of wage rigidity, both in real 
and nominal terms15. Also, one sees a higher degree of rigidity, both real and nominal, among 
12. The same conclusion regarding the high degree of real wage rigidity in Spain is also drawn from the Survey of Wage 
Formation in Firms. Around 55% of the Spanish fi rms surveyed responded that they apply automatic mechanisms to 
adjust wages for infl ation, as against 17% on average in the other countries in which the survey was conduct-
ed. 13. Approximated by the Social Security contributor groups. 14. This positive relationship between wage rigid-
ity and skill level is consistent with different wage formation models, such as, for example, effi ciency wage models, 
which predict that it is more diffi cult for fi rms to adjust the wages of higher skilled workers, since their productivity is 
more diffi cult to observe than that of lower skilled workers. At the same time, different models of labour turnover also 
tend to predict greater wage rigidity among higher skilled workers, since fi rms have a greater interest in retaining such 
workers. Finally, insider-outsider wage bargaining models, which take into account the greater bargaining power of 
higher skilled workers, are also consistent with these results. 15. In principle, the wage effi ciency and insider-outsider 
models mentioned above would tend to predict greater wage rigidity for the intermediate age group, in accordance with 
their combination of training and work experience. The fi ndings for Spain, as well as for Belgium [see Du Caju et al. 
(2008)], which show higher wage rigidity for young workers, would be consistent, however, with models in which fi rms 
do not wish to lower the wages of those workers who are most likely to leave the fi rm (in this case, young workers) to 
avoid the costs associated with labour turnover.
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a. The bars correspond to the distribution of wage changes and the line represents the estimation 
of a Weibull distribution with two tails centred on the average wage change. 
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workers with permanent contracts16. By fi rm size, the results obtained are not particularly 
conclusive, which is also the case when the analysis is made by sector of activity, where the 
differences are not large either.
As seen in Chart 3, the heterogeneity observed across countries in the extent to which wages 
respond to macroeconomic shocks is high. Institutional differences (in particular, in wage bar-
gaining mechanisms) may, therefore, be a fundamental factor in explaining these differences. In 
order to analyse which labour institutions may be most closely associated with wage rigidities, 
Messina et al. (2010) consider disaggregated data for 13 branches of activity and four countries 
(Spain, Belgium, Denmark and Portugal). This paper shows that the differences between countries 
Some determinants of the 
degree of wage rigidity. A 
cross-country 
comparative analysis17
16. However, it should be pointed out that the group of temporary workers for which greater wage fl exibility is estimated 
is a small and very specifi c group of such employees, since the estimation method requires that they stay at the fi rm for 
at least two consecutive years. 17. This section briefl y summarises the main results of Messina et al. (2010) published 
as Banco de España Documento de Trabajo No 1022.
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a. Percentage of workers whose wage is unchanged (in nominal or real terms), when in the 
absence of wage rigidity (nominal or real) it would have been cut.  
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in the degree of wage rigidity are much larger than those observed between branches of activ-
ity, despite the high level of sectoral disaggregation used. However, the variation across the 
sectors of one single country, equally affected by the national labour institutions, may also give 
a clue to some of the structural determinants of the degree of wage rigidity
First, in terms of the characteristics of the workers, the analysis of the four countries men-
tioned shows no clear association between labour rigidity and the distribution of employment 
at the sectoral level by sex, age group or fi rm size. However, one does observe, in line with the 
results discussed above, that wage rigidity is greater in those sectors with a larger proportion 
of highly skilled workers.
Also, the results show a negative relationship between the degree of real wage rigidity and the 
presence of fi rm-level agreements. In the four countries analysed, the most common level of 
bargaining is the sectoral level and the results suggest that, in those branches of activity in 
which agreements at a more decentralised level play a greater role, wages are ultimately more 
fl exible. Some studies [Cardoso and Portugal (2005), for example] show that in some of these 
countries fi rm-level bargaining ultimately leads to larger wage increases than those negotiated 
at the sectoral level, but this positive difference also offers greater fl exibility to fi rms to adjust 
their wages in response to negative shocks.
In the case of Spain, it should be recalled that collective bargaining takes place predominantly at the 
sectoral level, within each province, which implies an intermediate level of centralisation, while the 
employment conditions of only around 10% of workers are negotiated at the fi rm level (see Table 5). 
The empirical evidence for Spain indicates moreover that the intermediate level of bargaining (pro-
vincial sectoral level) produces settlements that are generally higher than those agreed at a more 
centralised level (national sector level) or at a more decentralised level (fi rm). As seen in Table 5, both 
the initially agreed wage increase and the impact of the indexation clause were lower in virtually 
REAL NOMINAL
BY GROUPS OF WORKERS:
OCCUPATION Skilled non-manual 45.0 18.4
Unskilled non-manual 35.5 16.0
Skilled manual 34.5 15.8
Unskilled manual 26.7 15.9
AGE GROUP 16-29 42.1 21.1
30-44 34.1 15.9
45-64 30.0 12.5
BY CHARACTERISTICS OF EMPLOYMENT:
TYPE OF CONTRACT Temporary 21.4 9.3
Permanent 34.2 16.4
SIZE OF FIRM < 20 workers 27.6 19.5
20-200 workers 34.9 15.4
> 200 workers 32.5 15.1
SECTOR OF ACTIVITY Industry 36.9 14.3
Construction 35.4 18.8
Market services 31.4 17.9
WAGE RIGIDITY ESTIMATIONS (a)  TABLE 4 
SOURCES: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales and Banco de España. 
 
a. Percentage of workers whose wage is unchanged (in nominal or real terms), when in the absence of wage rigidity (nominal or real) it would 
have been cut. 
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every year of the period 2003-10 in the case of fi rm agreements than in that of agreements at other 
levels. As a result, the revised wage increase (which includes the impact of the wage indexation 
clause) under fi rm agreements was lower than under agreements negotiated at other levels.18
Meanwhile, the importance of variable payments in total labour costs slightly reduces the de-
gree of wage rigidity, both in real and nominal terms. In this respect, the results show that 
these variable payments are no substitute for greater fl exibility in the basic wage, and it is 
precisely in those sectors in which they are most important that one tends also to fi nd a lower 
degree of wage rigidity. Finally, although the results are less conclusive, using a measure of 
competition in the product market one fi nds that greater competition is associated with lower 
wage rigidity in nominal terms, possibly refl ecting the impact of competition on the profi ts and 
the wage formation mechanism.
This article presents estimates of the extent to which wages respond to macroeconomic 
shocks using a methodology that means they can be compared with those available for other 
countries. The main results show that wage rigidity in Spain is high in real terms and similar to 
that found in certain other European countries in which the degree of wage indexation is high. 
This result is consistent with the basic characteristics of the collective bargaining system in 
Spain, which assign a dominant role to infl ation among the determinants of wage increases 
and a minimal role to fi rm-level bargaining. As seen, this generates a high degree of wage in-
ertia that hampers the necessary adjustment of wages to the specifi c conditions of each fi rm 
and the cyclical position of the economy.
Wage developments during the economic crisis have been indicative of the diffi culties involved 
in restoring competitiveness to the economy without sharp increases in unemployment. 
Conclusions
18. Izquierdo, Moral and Urtasun (2003) present similar evidence for the 1990s, even when the impact of a broad set of 
characteristics of the collective agreements is controlled for.
LEVEL OF BARGAINING
NEGOTIATED WAGE INCREASE
As a percentage
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (a) 2010 (a)
TOTAL 3.48 3.01 3.17 3.29 3.14 3.60 2.28 1.32
 Firm 2.70 2.61 2.94 2.92 2.70 3.09 2.20 1.09
 Other level 3.58 3.06 3.19 3.34 3.20 3.65 2.29 1.34
Percentage of  workers affected by ?rm-level 
agreements
10.75 9.95 10.78 11.01 10.87 10.15 9.72 6.97
REVISED WAGE INCREASE
As a percentage
TOTAL 3.68 3.60 4.04 3.59 4.21 3.60 2.26 2.09
 Firm 2.94 3.14 3.61 3.15 3.57 3.09 2.20 1.55
 Other level 3.77 3.65 4.09 3.65 4.28 3.65 2.27 2.13
INDEXATION CLAUSE
In percentage points
TOTAL 0.20 0.59 0.87 0.30 1.06 0.00 -0.02 0.77
 Firm 0.24 0.53 0.67 0.23 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.46
 Other level 0.19 0.59 0.90 0.31 1.09 0.00 -0.02 0.79
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS TABLE 5 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración. 
 
a. Provisional data, on information to January 2011; in particular, the 2010 data may change in the coming months. 
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Indeed, if these patterns of wage determination are maintained in the current economic cir-
cumstances, marked by a rise in infl ation that should be temporary, since it largely arises from 
the impact of certain tax increases and the rise in the oil price, then infl ation will remain at 
higher rates, with the consequent loss of competitiveness and reduction in employment and 
activity in the Spanish economy.
The recent reform of the labour market will help reduce the degree of wage rigidity in the Span-
ish economy. The introduction of new possibilities for decentralising collective bargaining must 
be exploited in order to increase wage fl exibility and thereby reduce the excessive volatility of 
employment in the Spanish economy. The reform of collective bargaining, planned for the fi rst 
quarter of this year, is bound to play a fundamental role in overcoming the labour market inef-
fi ciencies that have recurrently manifested themselves in very large increases in unemployment.
11.2.2011.
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